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ABSTRACT 
 
 This paper examines state tax systems and provides an explanation for 
their structure.  The results of this study show that states maximize the value of a 
tax by increasing its use based on the demographic makeup of the state.  
Furthermore, this paper provides some evidence that groups are not successful in 
lobbying state legislatures to protect themselves from taxation.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 All levels of government in the United States tax.  From the federal 
behemoth to the local school board, each extracts money from its constituents.  
Government has many options when collecting these funds.  Much like in 
production, there is a taxation frontier.    
A production possibilities curve maps the allocation of resources needed 
to produce products such as televisions and bulldozers.  A taxation possibilities 
curve shows how government can mix taxes such as property, income, and sales 
to collect the funds used to operate their enterprises.  There exists an infinite 
number of ways to produce televisions and bulldozers.  There is also an infinite 
number of ways to tax. A taxation possibilities curve is depicted below in Figure 
1.  The choice here is between sales and property tax.  The frontier represents the 
maximum amount that government can extract from its citizens without creating 
civil unrest.  The curves V1 and V2 are voter indifference curves similar to those 
used by Peltzman (1976).  Point A represents the point of equilibrium between the 
voters and the taxation frontier.  In this case the state would levy sales tax equal to 
S* and property tax equal to P*.  In production the interesting questions are raised 
when trying to understand why production choices are made.  Similarly, 
government becomes interesting when attempting to understand how it makes its 
many decisions. 
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Figure 1: Taxation Possibilities Curve 
   Citizens demand a vast and limitless array of services, and states provide 
many of these at the cost of taxation and the resulting deadweight losses.  To 
produce whatever services it does, government must generate revenue.  This 
revenue is generated by taxation.  However, this is government not private 
business.  Those demanding the service are not required to pay the full cost or 
even any of the cost of the service.  The government decides how to gather the 
revenue and provide the services.  I assume they will choose a combination of 
taxes that places them on the taxation frontier.  This choice is the subject of this 
paper.   
This study will examine the composition of state tax systems.  The next 
section provides an overview of the types of taxes used by states.  Next, a review 
of the literature will build a framework for this study.  Regression results will be 
reported that explain the state tax structure.  Finally, some concluding statements 
will be made.
Sales 
Tax 
Property Tax P* 
S* 
A 
V1 
V2 
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CHAPTER II 
TYPES OF TAXES 
Property Tax 
 Property tax has unique characteristics.  Unlike the other forms of taxation 
in which the tax base is determined by private activity, the property tax base is a 
creation of the government.  The legislature has wide ranging discretion over 
what type and the amount of property included in the base.  In addition, the 
government determines how property is valued and what percentage of that value 
will be taxed.   
 A. Assessment Method 
Once the decision of what property will be taxed is made, the property 
must be assessed.  Government assigns this duty to a private individual, or in the 
case of Maryland and Montana, a government agency.  It is the duty of the 
assessor to accurately determine the value of the property.  Obviously, this can be 
a subjective decision.  Several methods have been developed in order to inject 
some objectivity into the process. 
 The three methods used in assessment are the comparative sales approach, 
the cost approach, and the income approach.  The comparative sales method uses 
data from recent sales of similar property to determine value.  The cost approach 
uses the historical cost of the property as a starting point.  Adjustments are then 
made based on depreciation and improvements made to the property.  The third 
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method, the income approach, determines the present value of the net income 
expected to be generated by the property.   
B. Rate 
While technically a tax rate is determined once the assessment is 
determined, it is probably conceptually more appropriate to imagine that the tax 
rate and assessment are determined contemporaneously as the legislature 
determines the amount of tax it wishes to collect via this route.  In addition, once 
the rate is set, if assessed property value increases from one year to the next, 
additional revenue can be raised without moving the rate.  Government can claim 
that taxes have not been raised, yet revenue has increased.  However, this ruse 
will be ineffective if the public is even somewhat intelligent. 
It is important to remember that there are often institutions competing 
within the state for property tax revenue.  Counties, cities, and even school 
districts are allowed to use property tax to generate revenue.  Laws and 
regulations are in place that set up a priority system.  Each jurisdiction is given 
taxation powers over a certain type of property or percentage of property.  These 
jurisdictions must find an equilibrium so that they are not overtaxing property.   
C. Tax Relief   
The first instrument used to provide property tax relief is a limit on 
assessed values.  Because the legislature is in control of the assessment process, 
this limit insures property owners that the legislature will not use this control to 
boost tax revenue.   Another form of relief is the homestead exemption.  This 
allows for a percentage of the home value to be exempt from taxation.  Similarly, 
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farmland is assessed differently than normal land and is often completely exempt 
from taxation.   
The final two methods of relief allow tax payers to credit or deduct their 
property tax expense.  Tax payers who itemize their federal income tax are 
allowed to deduct their property tax bill from their federal income tax.  Similarly, 
if the property tax exceeds a certain percentage of a taxpayer’s income, they are 
allowed to credit that payment on their state income tax.  Senior citizens, who 
have low income tax bills but high property tax bills, are the target of this relief. 
Sales Tax 
 A sales tax, in its truest form, is intended to be a tax on the final personal 
consumption of residents of the jurisdiction levying the tax.  However, in reality it 
falls very short of this ideal.  There are many reasons why a pure sales tax does 
not exist.  Perhaps the most basic is that society has become extremely mobile.  In 
the past, it was an event when a person left their hometown.  Today, the cost of 
travel is much lower.  Because of this change, consumption is not always 
performed in a consumer’s jurisdiction of residence.  The sales tax has become as 
much a tax on visitors as it is on residents.  
 However, a sales tax is technically a use tax.  Therefore, if a person 
attempts to avoid sales tax by purchasing a car, or any other good, in an adjacent 
state, legally they are required to pay a use tax within their state of residence.  
This applies to purchases made not only in brick and mortar stores, but also online 
merchants.   
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Traditionally, states have been unable to collect use tax on small ticket 
items such as books, clothing, etc.  Use tax has typically been collected on items 
such as cars and boats that must be registered through the state.  However, due to 
the increase use of online retailers, states have become aggressive in collecting 
use tax.  Some states now include a line item on state income tax requiring the 
estimation of purchases made online or out of state.  States rely on sales tax to 
fund many state sponsored programs, and they will adapt in order to capture this 
revenue. 
 A. Base 
 As mentioned above, a true sales tax would be a tax on all uses of income 
except investment.  In reality, states exempt major categories of consumption 
from taxation.  It is politically impossible to have a true sales tax.  Consumption 
goods have become the biggest targets of sales tax.  Today only about 50-60% of 
total consumption across the country is taxed. 
 B. Location 
 There are two options when deciding when to tax consumption.  The tax 
can be applied at the origin or at the destination.  In today’s society, rarely do 
these two places overlap.  Therefore, there is the potential for the tax to be applied 
at both locations.  However, this is rarely the case.  More often than not the 
destination is the point of taxation. 
C. Exemptions 
 Due to the nature of sales tax, the tax burden is proportional to the level of 
consumption.  Therefore, those with high incomes use a smaller percent of 
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income for consumption than those with relatively lower incomes.  This is what is 
known as a regressive tax.  Because of this, exemptions or credits are granted for 
necessities.  A credit system is more effective in creating a progressive tax 
structure.  Exemptions change the relative price of goods and encourage the 
purchase of untaxed goods.  Credits simply lower the tax burden of those with 
low incomes.  
Income Tax 
 Ever since the passage of the sixteenth amendment Americans have been 
very familiar with the term income tax.  However, the federal government is not 
alone in their use of income tax to generate revenue.  Forty one of the states have 
broad based income taxes.  Two others, Tennessee and New Hampshire, have a 
tax on capital income only.    
A. Base 
 Unlike the federal income tax, which uses the entire earned income as the 
starting base, the calculation of the base at the state level varies.  Many states 
simply use the federal government base.  The only difference becomes the rate 
applied to this taxable income.  Other states take a percent of the federal income 
tax and then adjust that percentage based on interest payments and other factors.  
The third method is called the Federal Adjusted Gross Income.  This is a formula 
that manipulates the federal number.  In addition, states allow exemptions and 
deductions that are defined within the state.  The final method is state specific 
rules.  Much like the property tax, states can become very creative in how they 
define the tax base. 
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CHAPTER III 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 While this paper will explore the structure of state tax systems, it could not 
exist without the literature of public choice and the growth of government.  Much 
of the structure and foundation of this paper comes from the McCormick and 
Tollison work: Politicians, Legislation, and the Economy.  Their examination of 
legislatures and their decision was crucial to the development of this paper.  In 
chapter three, McCormick and Tollison provide four testable implications.  They 
hypothesize that the more equal the size of the houses of a legislature, the more 
interest group activity.  Also, larger legislatures seem to negatively impact interest 
group activity.  Finally wealthier and more populous jurisdictions lead to more 
rent seeking and interest group activity.  This study will substitute taxation for 
interest group and rent seeking activity.  These are closely related and somewhat 
interchangeable. 
 If government was an insignificant part of the economy, any study of it 
would also be insignificant.  However, the size of the federal and state 
governments has expanded exponentially over the past century.  Peltzman (1980) 
provides an overview of this growth.  He states the growth of the middle class and 
the overall leveling of income is the major source of growth.  The middle class 
shares common interests and is able to organize and voice these interests.  They 
demand services from government, and their voice is heard because it is loud and 
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unified.  Government simply cannot ignore a major segment of the population 
calling for larger government.   
Becker and Mulligan (2003) provide additional explanation for growth.  
The tax system has become more efficient over the past fifty years.  Taxes 
themselves have not only become more efficient, but the collection mechanisms 
have also become much more efficient.  Becker and Mulligan provide evidence 
that these improved efficiencies, coupled with the growth in the efficiency on the 
spending side have driven growth.  
 Tax structure has also been examined in the literature.  Hettich and Winer 
(1988) found that there is no link between the tax structure and expenditure.  
However, they did make the point that the tax structure is a result of the 
minimization of opposition to the structure.  Government finds the path of least 
resistance and then taxes along that path. 
 Sauer (2001) arrived at a similar conclusion.  His study of gambling 
regulation showed that as the deadweight cost of taxation increases, government 
has to find alternative revenue sources.  Government finds taxes that have a lower 
relative price and adds them to the tax menu.  The government maximizes the 
value of this tax, and then moves on to the next revenue source.  
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CHAPTER IV 
DATA 
 This study uses state tax collection data from the years 1993 to 2005 
gathered from the United States Census Bureau.  This data contains information 
on all tax collections of all fifty states.  The data is itemized into four categories: 
property, sales, income, and all other taxes.  Summary statistics can be seen at the 
end in Table One. 
 In addition to the tax collection data, demographic data for each state was 
gathered from the Census Bureau.  This includes information on age, race, sex, 
per capita income, population density, state legislatures, and several other 
categories.  Summary statistics for these can be seen in Table Two.   
The variables are straightforward but a few need to be described more 
carefully.  Legislature size is the number of seats in both the house and senate of 
the state legislatures.  Next is a dummy variable indicating if the legislature meets 
every year.  The house to senate ratio is the number of seats in the lower house 
divided by the number of seats in the upper house.  Finally, population density is 
the number of people per square mile in each state.     
 
 
 
 
 
    12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    13 
CHAPTER V 
MODEL 
 In order to explain the tax system composition for the states, a total tax 
equation must first be estimated.  After the total tax equation is found, share 
equations will be estimated.  There will be four share equations for each 
observation.  These will be based on the four taxation categories: property, sales, 
income, and all other. 
 When modeling share equations, it can be difficult to obtain efficient 
coefficient estimates.  Zellner (1962) provides the process to insure this 
efficiency.  Each regression will be estimated with one share equation dropped.  
After these series of regressions are estimated, they will be compared to a 
seemingly unrelated regression where all share equations are included.  If the 
coefficients and standard errors differ greatly, the results of the regressions with 
each share equation omitted will be averaged to provide efficient estimators.   
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CHAPTER VI 
RESULTS 
 The results of the regressions can be seen in Table Three.  Coefficients 
and t-statistics are reported for each variable.  The system of regressions with the 
omitted share equations was identical to the system when all were included.  
Therefore, the coefficients reported are efficient. 
Taxes are named for what they tax.  These names sometimes distract from 
the fact that people are paying the taxes.  In order to understand how states tax, it 
is imperative to see what groups of people influence the use of a certain type of 
tax. 
 Income 
Young white females increase the use of income tax by state governments.  
The coefficients of each of these variables were significant in the regression.  This 
is a counterintuitive result.  Young people’s wealth is composed mainly of earned 
income.  They have not had time to save or invest in other wealth producing 
opportunities.  Conversely, older people usually have lower wage income than 
working people.  They have retired and are living off of investments.  Therefore, 
it would be likely that those over sixty-five years of age would be demanding 
higher income tax.  They would be able to benefit from the services provided by 
the state without having to pay. 
Kau and Rubin (1981) claim that females entering the labor force were a 
significant factor in the growth of government in the middle part of the twentieth 
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century.  This effect could be showing up in this data.  Governments see a 
segment of the population that has not been taxed.  It is an alternative revenue 
source that can be exploited.  Therefore, the government will tax this previously 
protected segment. 
Property 
Much like the results above for income tax, the property tax regression 
provides a counterintuitive result.  The coefficients for white and male were both 
statistically significant.  Historically, white males have been the primary land 
holder in the United States.  This is a group that should be fighting property 
taxation.  However, they are the primary source for its growth. 
This seems to be a repeat of the income tax result.  Because white males 
own the most property, they are the most valuable group for property taxation.  
They are the biggest target and the most valuable to the government.  State 
governments are maximizing the value of the property tax by focusing on the 
group that owns property.    
Sales 
Once again, the sales tax regression provides an unexpected result.  The 
over 65 and male variable were both statistically significant in the regression.  
Older members of the population should be vehemently opposed to sales tax.  
Personal consumption is the predominant activity of older people.  They are no 
longer working and earning income, but they are spending from their retirement 
accounts.  Therefore, they should be vocal in their opposition to sales tax.  Becker 
and Mulligan (1999) showed that the elderly are one of the most politically 
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powerful demographics in society.  The older members of the population should 
be able to influence government to protect their interests.   
The question becomes why does the regression show that the increased 
presence of the elderly result in more sales tax?  The answer comes back to the 
potential for taxation.  The elderly spend.  In fact, that is all they do.  They are no 
longer earning income.  The only way for the government to tax them is to do it 
through sales tax.  Apparently, the voice of the elderly is not loud enough to 
protect them from the taxation powers of the state governments. 
Other Results 
McCormick and Tollison’s work on legislatures and interests groups 
provided four testable implications.  The hypothesis that wealthier states resulted 
in higher total tax revenue held in this study.  In the share equations, only sales 
produced a negative sign on income per capita.  In all other regressions the 
coefficient on income per capita was positive, and only in the property tax 
regression was the coefficient insignificant.   
The prediction that tax revenue would decrease as the size of the 
legislature increased was found to be false.  In both the total tax revenue 
regression and the share equation regressions, the coefficient on legislature size 
was positive.  Only in the total tax regression was the coefficient significant. 
However, the ratio of house sizes proved to follow the results of 
McCormick and Tollison.  The sign on the ratio coefficient in the total tax 
revenue regression was negative and significant.  Additionally, the income tax 
share equation further confirmed the hypothesis as it was also negative and 
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significant.  The property and sales coefficient was positive, but in each case it 
was insignificant. 
McCormick and Tollison hypothesized that the population coefficient 
would be positive.  The regression results here confirm this hypothesis.  In both 
the total tax revenue and sales regression the coefficient was positive.  Indicating 
as population grows tax revenue grows.  However, only in the sales tax regression 
was the variable significant.  The income and property coefficient was negative, 
but insignificant in each equation. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
 Overall, the value of this paper is the proof that governments rationally 
organize their tax structure in order to maximize its value.  The legislature 
responds to the demographic makeup and adjusts the menu of taxes based on the 
activity of groups.  As in production where inputs are used in order to maximize 
their value to the production process, taxes are administered to maximize their 
value to the state.    
In addition, this study shows that groups are not very successful in 
lobbying government to prevent from being taxed.  It could be the case that these 
groups are not vocal enough to prevent from being taxed.  There is opportunity 
for further exploration of the success or failure of lobbying efforts. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Table 1: State Tax Revenue Statistics (Thousands) 
Variable Observation Mean Std Deviation Min Max 
Total Tax 650 9,821.71 12,100.00 589.069 98,400.00 
Income  650 3,312.46 5,343.66 0 44,600.00 
Property 650 203.00 537.48 0 3,870.61 
Sales 650 4,764.32 5,549.94 96.014 37,700.00 
Other 650 1,541.93 1,902.57 118.515 15,600.00 
 
Table 2: State Demographic Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Income Per Capita 650 26730.11 5555.895 15290 47519 
Income Per Capita Growth 650 0.0400 0.0543 -0.3589 0.5445 
Percent Over 65 650 0.1264 0.0194 0.0452 0.1855 
Percent Male 650 0.4908 0.0083 0.4789 0.5279 
Percent White 650 0.8419 0.1195 0.2614 0.9855 
Population Growth 650 13.838 11.1727 0.500 66.3 
Legislature Size 650 147.62 59.5985 49 424 
Legislature Meets Every Year 650 0.88 0.3252 0 1 
House to Senate Ratio 650 2.8961 2.1742 0 16.667 
Population Density 650 177.4724 242.2842 1.0438 1172.776 
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Table 3: Regression Results 
Dependent Variable Total Tax Percent 
Income  
Percent 
Property  
Percent 
Sales  
Percent 
Other  
 
Income Per Capita 
 
574.115* 
(5.29) 
 
6.33e-06* 
(4.01) 
 
6.32e-08 
(0.13) 
 
-3.64e-06* 
(-2.43) 
 
-2.32e-06 
(-2.17) 
 
Income Per Capita 
Growth 
 
-851741.3 
(-0.11) 
 
-0.0868 
(-0.80) 
 
-0.0461 
(-1.34) 
 
0.1259 
(1.22) 
 
-0.0011 
(-0.01) 
 
Percent Over 65 
 
-3.53e+07 
(-1.20) 
 
-2.0385* 
(-4.90) 
 
0.1668 
(1.26) 
 
3.4312* 
(8.69) 
 
-1.5850* 
(-5.64) 
 
Percent Male 
 
4.30e+07 
(0.44) 
 
-8.1063* 
(-5.83) 
 
2.0920* 
(4.75) 
 
1.034 
(0.78) 
 
5.2988* 
(5.65) 
 
Percent White 
 
-6849543 
(-1.77) 
 
0.1657* 
(3.01) 
 
0.0485* 
(2.78) 
 
-0.2348* 
(-4.50) 
 
0.0166 
(0.45) 
 
Population Growth 
 
60294.24 
(1.35) 
 
-0.0012 
(-1.91) 
 
-0.003 
(-1.61) 
 
0.0062* 
(10.26) 
 
-0.0048* 
(-11.23) 
 
Legislature Size 
 
105813.7* 
(7.13) 
 
0.0044 
(2.00) 
 
0.0001 
(1.49) 
 
0.00012 
(0.57) 
 
-0.0007* 
(-4.46) 
 
Legislature Meets 
Every Year 
 
1491334 
(0.94) 
 
0.0197 
(0.87) 
 
0.0044 
(0.61) 
 
0.0769* 
(3.58) 
 
-0.1014* 
(-6.63) 
 
House to Senate 
Ratio 
 
-2664989* 
(-7.27) 
 
-0.0311* 
(-5.72) 
 
0.0025 
(1.43) 
 
0.0050 
(0.97) 
 
0.0242* 
(6.58) 
 
Population Density 
 
3788.967 
(1.51) 
 
0.00002 
(0.57) 
 
-0.00001 
(-1.26) 
 
-0.00006 
(-1.95) 
 
0.00059 
(2.45) 
 
Total Tax Revenue 
 
n/a 
 
1.54e-10 
(0.25) 
 
1.66e-11 
(0.09) 
 
6.33e-10 
(1.10) 
 
-7.92e-10 
(-1.94) 
 
Constant 
 
2.71e+07 
(-0.54) 
 
4.2635 
(6.03) 
 
-1.0844 
(-4.84) 
 
-0.3449 
(-0.51) 
 
-1.9889 
(-4.17) 
R-Squared 0.2268 0.2556 0.1466 0.2675 0.4483 
Observations 550 550 550 550 550 
* Indicates significance at 1% level 
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